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I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED 
MORGAN'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS 
UNNECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THAT HER INJURIES 
WERE CAUSED BY T H E ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF THE 
HOSPITAL. 
Defendants rely upon this Court's ruling in Fox v. Brigham Young 
University, 2007 UT App, 406,176 P.3d 446., to argue that expert witness 
testimony is necessary in the present case to prevent jurors from having to 
"resort to speculation when making a decision on whether the alleged 
negligence caused Morgan's injuries/' In Fox, the plaintiff sued the university 
alleging negligence that caused her to fall down a flight of steps on campus, 
resulting in a broken right leg. Significantly, the plaintiff made several 
statements to the EMTs responding to the scene: 
While the EMTs were assessing her condition and treating her, Mrs. Fox 
repeatedly stated to them that she felt her right knee go out as she was 
going down. She explained to the EMTs that she fell down only one 
stair, that she had been previously diagnosed with osteoarthritis in her 
right knee, and that there was some missing cartilage in that knee. Mrs. 
Fox also stated that she did not hold BYU responsible, but that she had 
always felt that the stairs by the Harman Building were too narrow and 
have always been dangerous. 
Id. at f 5. 
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The plaintiffs did not provide a causation expert, arguing instead that 
Mrs. Fox's injuries were "within the realm of common experience and because 
there was no significant lapse of time between the injury and the onset of the 
physical condition for which Ms. Fox sought compensation." Id. at f 9. The 
trial court granted summary judgment. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial 
court's ruling, holding that the trial court "did not err in dismissing the Foxes' 
negligence claim for failure to present expert testimony on the element of 
causation because the factors associated with Mrs. Fox's fall and injury were 
sufficiently medically complex to require such testimony." Id. at f 25. 
The present case is distinguished from FAX in several respects. First, 
contrary to Defendants' characterization, Midge Morgan ("Midge") did not 
have a "long history of shoulder problems." Midge testified that she dislocated 
her right shoulder in 1970, requiring surgery to put a staple. The staple was 
removed approximately three or four months later. (Rec. 261) She testified that 
between 1970 and 1998, she had no further shoulder problems. (Rec. 261) In 
June of 1998, Midge was in an automobile accident. As a result of that 
accident, she suffered pain in the upper part of her shoulders, where they 
connect to her neck. (Rec. 262). Midge's treating physician, Dr. Stephen J. 
Warner ("Dr. Warner") testified that the symptoms Midge reported at this time 
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were consistent with neck injuries sustained in the automobile accident and not 
shoulder injuries. (Rec. 285; 289, f^ 8) Midge testified that she does not recall 
any doctor telling her that she had any preexisting or degenerative shoulder 
injuries. (Rec. 269) Immediately after the incident with Nurse Rebecca Davis 
("Ms. Davis"), Midge did not provide alternate explanations for her injuries, 
unlike Mrs. Fox. She testified that the pain she felt after Ms. Davis attempted 
to yank her out of the bed was unlike anything she had ever felt before. (Rec. 
276) In short, Midge's injuries bear litde resemblance to those in Fox. 
Second, unlike Fox, Defendants in the present case were not passive 
agents in Midge's injuries. No other human actors directly acted upon Mrs. 
Fox; her leg gave out as she was descending the stairs. In the present case, 
Midge's injuries did not occur because she was simply lying in her hospital bed. 
Midge argues that her injuries were the direct result of the actions of Ms. Davis, 
the agent of the Defendants. Midge alleges that had Ms. Davis not attempted 
to yank Midge out of bed, her rotator cuffs would not have torn. 
Plaintiff also rejects the argument that Defendants' unrebutted expert 
testimony warrants summary judgment. In Bac^uk p. Salt Lake Regional Medical 
Center, 2000 UT App. 225, 8 P.3d 1037, this Court rejected the argument that 
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summary judgment is always warranted in cases where one party provides 
unrebutted exculpatory evidence, holding: 
When a plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur, "[if] any defendant can come 
forward with a conclusive exculpatory statement or explanation of how the 
injury occurred, then the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not apply 
because there is no longer a need for an inference of negligence or 
causation." If, however, defendant's explanation is not conclusive, "then 
it is up to the finder of fact to decide whether plaintiff has established all 
of the elements of negligence.. .by a preponderance of the evidence." 
Id. at \ 17 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
In the present case, Defendants argue that the nature of Midge's injuries 
require expert testimony in order to be understood by the jurors. To support 
this argument, Defendants offer the testimony of Dr. Bruce Evans ("Dr. 
Evans") to explain how Midge's injuries occurred. Dr. Evans testified that in 
his opinion, the rotator cuff injuries Midge suffered were inconsistent with they 
type of injury she alleges. (Rec. 425-426). The testimony of Dr. Evans is 
offered as an exculpatory explanation of the cause of Midge's injuries. 
Plaintiff counters Dr. Evans' testimony with that of Midge's treating 
physicians, Dr. Warner and Dr. Michael Metcalf ("Dr. Metcalf). Dr. Warner 
testified that he has cared for Midge since May 4,1999. (Rec. 282) He also 
testified that the symptoms Midge complained of prior to the surgery on 
February 26, 2003, were consistent with her neck injuries, not shoulder 
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problems. (Rec. 239, ^ f 8; 285) He also testified that if the incident happened as 
Midge described, this single incident could have torn both of Midge's rotator 
cuffs. (Rec. 288-289) In the present case, therefore, Defendants have not 
offered a "conclusive exculpatory statement or explanation of how the injury 
occurred," as this Court held in Bac^uk. As such, summary judgment was 
inappropriate in this case. It falls to the finder of fact to examine all of the facts 
of the case to determine whether Plaintiff has established all of the elements of 
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH 
THE STANDARD OF CARE AND BREACH OF THE 
STANDARD OF CARE IN THIS CASE. 
Defendants argue that expert witness testimony is required to 
demonstrate the standard of care and breach of the standard of care in medical 
malpractice cases. Defendants cite D alley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 
791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990), and Chadmck v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 
1987) to support this contention. But a closer reading of these and other cases 
indicates that the rule is not as clear-cut as Defendants would make it appear. 
In D alley, for example, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit, claiming 
that she received a burn on her right calf while undergoing an elective caesarian 
section operation. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary 
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judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to produce expert medical 
testimony to establish what instrumentality caused the burn. In overturning the 
trial court's decision, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
It would appear that it is within the knowledge and experience of 
laypersons that a woman with a healthy leg does not usually go into an 
operating room for a caesarean section operation and emerge with a 
burn on her leg without some occurrence of negligence. This type of 
inference does not require expert testimony concerning the standard of 
care and breach of that standard. 
Another requirement to establish the evidentiary foundation of res ipsa 
loquitur is that the plaintiff prove that she did not contribute to the 
injury suffered. Again, it would appear that it is within the general 
experience and knowledge of laypersons that a woman who is under an 
epidural anesthetic rendering her essentially paralyzed from the waist 
down during the caesarian section delivery of a child generally is not in a 
position to negligently or intentionally burn herself on the back of her 
right calf. We conclude that laypersons are capable of discerning whether 
the injury occurred irrespective of any participation by the plaintiff. 
Jft,791P.2datl96. 
A better reading of the rule regarding expert testimony in medical 
malpractice cases comes from King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 
(Utah 1992). In King, the plaintiff brought suit against her physician and the 
manufacturer of an intrauterine device (IUD), after the IUD perforated her 
uterus. The trial court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer. In 
reversing and remanding the trial court's ruling, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
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Accordingly expert evidence is usually necessary to establish either direct 
evidence of malpractice or a foundation for a legitimate res ipsa 
inference, "because the nature of the [medical] profession removes the 
particularities of its practice from the knowledge and understanding of 
the average citizen. 
Of course, in some medical malpractice cases, common knowledge and experience of 
laypersons is sufficient to establish a foundation for a conclusion of negligence. A 
classic example is leaving a foreign object in a patient's body during 
surgery. Clearly, a lay person can reasonably and legitimately infer from 
his or her common knowledge and experience that leaving a foreign 
object in a person during a surgical operation is a negligent act. 
Id, 832 P.2d 858, 862 863 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
In Bac^uk, the plaintiff received a pressure injury and burns to his 
buttocks and right leg from a heating pad while he was undergoing surgery to 
reattach fingers that had been severed in a snowblower accident. The 
defendants moved for summary judgment, on the grounds that the plaintiff had 
offered no expert opinion to rebut the defendants' expert opinions. The trial 
court granted summary judgment, concluding that, in the absence of such 
expert testimony, there was no issue of material fact regarding the defendants' 
alleged negligence. In reversing and remanding the trial court's decision, this 
Court held that "[i]t is within the understanding of laypersons that [the 
plaintiffs] burn and/or pressure injury on an originally uninjured part of his 
body not involved in the surgery more probably than not resulted from 
negligence." Id. at f 7. This Court went on to state: 
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It requires no medical or technical expertise to understand that a person 
may suffer a burn and/or a pressure injury from lying in the same 
position for too long on a heating pad. Nor does it require medical 
expertise to understand the steps that must be taken to avoid such 
injuries. Accordingly, Plaintiff was justified in relying on the 
understanding of laypersons to survive Defendants' summary judgment 
motion. 
Defendants argue that their experts' affidavits show that the cause of 
Plaintiffs injury is beyond the understanding of laypersons. Where, as 
here, a plaintiff relies on the knowledge and understanding of laypersons 
to establish the evidentiary foundation from which negligence may be 
inferred, "a defendant may challenge the adequacy of that foundation 
with evidence showing that [the inference of negligence] is actually 
beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience." However, 
summary judgment for defendants will be denied if "the res ipsa loquitur 
inference [is] strong enough to survive a motion for a directed verdict at 
the close of the plaintiffs case." 
Id. atffij 1142 (internal citations omitted). 
In Collins v. Utah State Developmental Center, 1999 UT App. 336, 992 P.2d 
492, the plaintiff brought suit as guardian for a mentally retarded adult residing 
in an intermediate care facility. The individual was injured while playing on a 
swing while under the supervision of two staff members of the facility. The trial 
court granted the facility's motion for a direct verdict on the grounds that 
without expert testimony, the plaintiff did not establish the applicable standard 
of care and the breach thereof. In reversing and remanding the trial court's 
ruling, this Court held that expert testimony was unnecessary: 
R 
The record does not show, and the Center does not suggest, that the 
implementation of the decision to allow Collins to swing had "to be 
performed by a person with medical training or that it involved the 
exercise of medical judgment or required medical expertise." Most jurors 
could easily ascertain the standard of care owed to a three-year-old when 
supervising her on a swing. Similarly, they would understand the 
standard of care owed to a person with Collins5 capacities. Simply put, 
the duty the Center owed to Collins, and its alleged breach, required no 
expert testimony. 
Collins therefore did not need expert testimony to establish the 
appropriate standard of care and any breach thereof. "In this type of 
situation, the plaintiff can rely on the common knowledge and 
understanding of laymen to establish this element" 
U, 1999 UT App 336, ffij 10-11, 992 P.2d 492 (internal citations omitted). 
Also illuminating in the present case is the Georgia Court of Appeals 
decision in Moore v. Louis Smith Memorial Hospital, Inc., 454 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. App. 
1995), discussed at length by the Utah Court of Appeals in Collins, 1999 UT 
App. 336, ffl| 9-10, 992 P.2d 492. In Moore, a nursing home patient was injured 
when being moved from her wheelchair to her bed when her foot became 
caught in a bed rail. The court held that expert testimony was not necessary in 
this case, as the circumstances did not require the exercise of expert medical 
judgment: 
In this case, plaintiff was injured while being moved from her wheelchair 
to her bed. The record does not show and defendant does not suggest 
that this aspect of plaintiff s care was required to be performed by a 
person with medical training or that it involved the exercise of medical 
judgment or required medical expertise. "[U]nder all of the evidence of 
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record, the safe movement of [plaintiff] from the [wheelchair to the bed] 
was merely an act of relative physical strength and dexterity rather than 
an act requiring the exercise of expert medical judgment." 
Id., 454 S.E.2d 192 (citation omitted, alterations in original). The facts in Moore 
are quite similar to the present case. Both involve moving patients, rather than 
complex medical procedures or specialized medical knowledge. Removing 
Midge safely from the bed, as in Moore, was simply a matter of the relative 
strength and dexterity of Ms. Davis. It did not require the exercise of expert 
medical judgment. This appears to be the type of exception to the expert 
witness requirement envisioned by the weight of Utah case law. 
Likewise, in the present case, it would appear to "be within the 
knowledge and experience of laypersons" that a woman does not usually go 
into the hospital for neck surgery and emerge with not one, but two torn 
rotator cuffs without some kind of negligence. Plaintiff is justified in relying on 
the understanding of laypersons to understand the circumstances surrounding 
her injuries. Midge testified that prior to the surgery on February 26, 2003, the 
pain she was suffering did not come from the location of the rotator cuffs. 
(Rec. 262). Dr. Warner testified that he did not attribute the pain Midge 
experienced as related to her shoulders. (Rec. 288) Immediately after the 
incident with Ms. Davis, Midge testified that she felt excruciating pain where 
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the shoulders and upper arms meet, and that it was unlike anything she had 
experienced before. (Rec. 276). 
The present case is also distinguishable from both Hoopiiaina and 
Chadwick. In Hoopiiaina, for example, the plaintiff contended that he was 
mistakenly administered quinadine intended for another patient in the same 
hospital room. The plaintiff suffered injuries to his lungs and cardiovascular 
system, which he attributed to the drug. In this case, expert testimony was 
mandatory, as the effects of quinadine are clearly beyond the understanding of 
the average person. 
The issue in Chadwick was whether the defendant committed malpractice 
in the course of removing a varicose vein from the plaintiffs leg, a process 
known as a saphenous phlebectomy. Prior to this operation, plaintiff insisted 
on having a phleborheogram test done to determine if her veins and circulatory 
system were functioning properly. The plaintiff in this case conducted no 
discovery whatsoever. Expert testimony was required in this case in order to 
determine whether the defendant properly analyzed the results of the test prior 
to conducting the surgery, as this knowledge was also clearly beyond the 
understanding of the average person. This Court affirmed summary judgment 
for the defendant physician, on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to provide 
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qualified expert testimony necessary to understand the required standard of 
care. But in so doing, this Court reaffirmed the common knowledge exception 
to the expert witness rule, stating: 
Due to the technical and complex nature of a medical doctor's services, 
expert medical testimony must be presented at trial in order to establish 
the standard of care and proximate cause - except in unusual 
circumstances. For example, "expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the 
standard oj care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is 
within the common knowledge and experience of the layman!' 
Id., 763 P.2d at 821. (citations omitted) (emphasis added) 
The present case is significantly different. It does not require specialized 
knowledge of drugs, or of vascular surgery, to analyze the propriety of Ms. 
Davis' actions on the day in question. As the court held in Moore, this is an issue 
of relative strength and dexterity rather than an act requiring the exercise of 
expert medical judgment. No specialized knowledge is required, making expert 
testimony unnecessary. In addition, unlike Chadwick, extensive discovery has 
been conducted in this case. Several depositions have been taken, both parties 
have been served and answered, and both parties have provided documents. 
Midge's treating physicians are prepared to testify regarding the injuries to 
Midge's shoulders. The primary question at issue in this case concerns the 
manner in which Ms. Davis attempted to move Midge out of the hospital bed. 
Midge claims that Ms. Davis yanked her out of bed by the arms. Ms. Davis 
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claims that she put her arm around Midge's back to support her. This is a clear 
issue of fact, which makes summary judgment unwarranted in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is inappropriate in this case. Expert testimony is not 
necessary in this case, either to establish that her injuries were caused by the 
alleged negligence of the hospital or to establish the requisite standard of care 
and breach of the standard of care. Moving a patient from a hospital bed does 
not require the type of expert knowledge required in Hoopiiaina or Chadwick As 
the court held in Collins and Moore, in this kind of case, the plaintiff can rely on 
the common knowledge and understanding of laymen. A layperson can assess 
whether or not it is negligent to yank or jerk a patient out of a hospital bed with 
such force that it causes injury. 
In addition, the evidence provided by Dr. Metcalf, Dr. Warner and 
Midge creates a question of fact for the jury to determine whether Midge's torn 
rotator cuffs could have been caused by Ms. Davis yanking or jerking her out 
of bed. 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Midge Morgan respectfully requests 
the Court to reverse the decision of the trial court. 
DATED this 7?~ day of September 2010. 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
SUSAN BLACK DUNN 
CHRYSTAL MANCUSO-SMITH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Midge Morgan 
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